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Abstract
This paper studies how banks adjust their asset structure in response to changes in loan
demand after natural disasters. We show how banks help clients smoothen consumption
and support local recovery through their asset diversification strategy. In the empirical
part, using a difference-in-difference method, we find that U.S. commercial banks increase
real estate lending after disasters and sell government bonds to finance such a disaster-
driven demand surge. In the theoretical part of this paper we present a novel multiple-asset
dynamic credit rationing model that explains these empirical findings. Using simulations of
our model we can then predict and quantify the possible impact of climate change on the
asset structure and profitability of banks for different scenarios.
Keywords: banks, disasters, diversification, climate change
JEL: G21, Q54
1 Introduction
To understand the long-run impact of climate change on financial institutions, we can start by
understanding how the latter react to recent natural disasters. This paper studies how banks
adjust their asset structure in response to changes in loan demand after natural disasters such as
extreme weather events. In light of progressing climate change this issue is highly relevant and
likely to gain in relevance in years to come. To establish the empirical relevance of our study we
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first show that natural disasters affect the composition of loans and securities. We then present
a dynamic credit rationing model to illustrate the most important underlying mechanisms and
calibrate the model to reproduce our empirical findings. Using numerical simulations we can
then investigate the potential impact of climate change on banks’ balance sheets.
Since the most direct impact of natural disasters concerns banks’ lending behavior, this
paper fits well in the broader credit rationing literature. Credit rationing is a central topic
of banking research. This literature firmly established that banks manage risks and credit
portfolios more by rationing credit than by pricing strategies.1 If this behavior is observed under
normal conditions, it is likely to also be observed after exogenous shocks to credit demand. A
clear example of such an exogenous shock, would be an extreme weather event, such as a flood,
hurricane or storm. This events destroy or damage property and thus create demand for credit to
smooth consumption and rebuild productive assets. Against the background of climate change,
extreme weather events are likely to become more frequent (Pachauri et al., 2014). Indeed,
the impacts of climate change receive more attention from researchers, also in banking and
finance. An emerging strand of literature discusses how banks geographically reallocate assets
to meet disaster-driven increases in demand (Chavaz, 2014; Corte´s and Strahan, 2017), how
natural disasters affect banks’ solvency (Klomp, 2014), and how bank-borrower relationships
can affect borrowers’ access to credit after natural disasters (Berg and Schrader, 2012; Koetter
et al., 2016). With this paper we aim to contribute to this emerging literature.
To the best of our knowledge there are no studies investigating how banks may adjust the
composition of their asset portfolio in response to natural hazards. A diversification strategy
to manage natural hazards is important for banks as it follows standard practice in modern
banking and is therefore easy to implement. Moreover, it provides banks with a powerful
natural hedge against potentially large losses. By strategically (re)allocating assets between
asset classes, banks can better serve the increased loan demand after disasters and thereby aid
the recovery of economies hit by such events (Dlugosz et al., 2018).
To understand how banks diversify assets in response to (and anticipation of) natural
hazards, we present both empirical evidence and a theoretical analysis to examine how natural
hazards affect banks’ asset allocations. For the empirical analysis we use the Call Reports that
1There is a long list of papers on bank’s credit rationing. Theoretical papers include Stiglitz and Weiss (1981),
Brunnermeier et al. (2012), and Gorton and He (2008). Empirical studies on the lending behavior include Hannan
and Berger (1991), Angbazo (1997), Asea and Blomberg (1998), Carling and Lundberg (2005), and Zecchini and
Ventura (2009).
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contain information of all U.S. commercial banks’ balance sheet data over a period of 45 quarters
from 2002 to 2013 and make use of two natural disaster datasets. The EM-DAT dataset that
gives us detailed information about the time, location, type, magnitude, and damage of natural
disasters. We then used the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s records of major disaster
declarations in the U.S. as a reference to check and complete the data in EM-DAT.
In our empirical section, we identify the causal effect of natural disasters on banks’ asset
allocation by applying a difference-in-difference (DID) analysis, estimating disasters’ impact on
asset quantities of commercial banks, choosing a ±1 year window. Using the 86 most costly
natural disasters in the U.S. between 2001 and 2013, we find that the amounts of total loans
and real estate loans significantly increased after these natural disasters, while banks’ holdings
of government bonds decreased. This result is robust to different lengths of the event window
and consistent with previous findings. Firms and residents affected by natural disasters increase
their demand for (mortgage) loans and banks react to this increase by supplying loans while
selling government securities (Corte´s, 2017).
In our theoretical section, we then develop a dynamic credit rationing model introducing
multiple assets to also model the portfolio composition response. In our model, natural disasters
destroy firms’ and households’ fixed capital, leading to a surge in the demand for loans and an
increase in the borrowing rate. The impact of disasters on banks are then twofold. On the one
hand, banks suffer delayed or defaulted loan payment as disasters destroy borrowers’ capital and
repayment capacity. On the other hand, banks have the opportunity to service the increased
demand at higher interest rates, improving their margin and profitability.
We then calibrate our model to reproduce the key financial ratios we observe under nor-
mal conditions in our data and numerically simulate a negative disaster shock on firms’ and
households’ capital in order to replicate our empirical findings. In the simulations, as in our
data, we observe that banks increase post-disaster lending at higher interest rates, while selling
government securities to finance these new loans. Of course, their ability to do so then depends
on pre-disaster reserves and government security holdings. Both banks and society can thus
benefit from more robustly funded banks. First, banks can satisfy the demand for loans from
the public and thereby aid the recovery. Second, banks can increase their post-disaster revenue
to compensate for the losses related to disaster-induced defaults.
Finally, we simulate scenarios of climate change to see how banks will respond and reallocate
their assets. These simulations show that an increase in the (perceived) disaster probability due
to climate change will be associated with decreased lending, a lower level of capital, less revenue
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and higher holdings of government bonds in the pre-disaster steady state. In other words, our
model predicts that in normal times banks will keep a larger buffer of tradable government
securities in anticipation of bigger and more frequent climate induced shocks in credit demand
to benefit from ”peak-shaving.” Such behavior would be rational and socially optimal, but
our simulations also show this reduces banks’ income and returns-on-equity in normal times.
Consequently such a long-run rational strategy may clash with the interests of short-sighted
stock holders and a case for regulatory or supervisory interventions might be made.
Our paper thus makes three contributions. First, we empirically show that banks adjust
their asset structure after natural disasters. In itself this is not new, but in this paper we analyze
this in a setting with multiple assets and using state of the art empirical methods. Specifically,
we show that banks issue more loans secured by real estate and sell government bonds to finance
such increased lending. Second, we extend and generalize the Collier (2014) model to explain
how this change in the asset structure is driven by a disaster-related credit demand shock. To
model this, we introduce asset multiplicity and the credit demand side in the dynamic setting
of Collier (2014), producing the interactions we observe. To our knowledge, this feature has
not yet been introduced to the literature. Finally, our calibration and numerical simulation
results help us quantify the potential impact of climate change on banks’ balance sheets via
the channel of natural hazards. To the best of our knowledge, that link has been proposed and
hotly debated, but few have been able to provide sensible quantitative estimates of the impact.
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 positions our work in the relevant
literatures to bring out these contributions more. Section 3 introduces our data and section 4
uncovers how natural disasters affect banks asset allocations. Section 5 presents our theoretical
framework, calibrates the model, and compares model and data moments. Section 6 then
simulates the impact of disaster shocks and climate change. Section 8 concludes.
2 Positioning in the Literature
Our paper is related to several strands of literature. At the macroeconomic level, our paper
can be related to a handful of papers emphasizing the role of financial institutions in natural
disaster alleviation and recovery. Toya and Skidmore (2007) report that countries with more
complete financial systems suffer fewer economic losses after natural disasters. Noy (2009)
corroborates that a higher level of domestic credit enhances a country’s resilience to disaster
shocks, but meanwhile points out that countries having less open capital accounts are more
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robust to natural disasters. Loayza et al. (2009) examine the impact of natural disasters on
growth by disaster and industry type and assert that developing countries have more industrial
sectors affected than developed countries. The present paper goes beyond this literature by
zooming in on the responses of individual banks to natural disasters.
Concerning the micro-level behavior that explains the above phenomena, our paper can be
related also to the recent literature of credit dynamics during natural disaster times (Berg and
Schrader, 2012; Chavaz, 2014; Koetter et al., 2016; Corte´s and Strahan, 2017; Dlugosz et al.,
2018). For example, Berg and Schrader (2012) show that the demand for credit increases after
volcanic eruptions in Ecuador and find that bank-firm relationships positively predict firms’
post-disaster access to credit. Focusing on the supply side, Chavaz (2014) shows that local banks
of disaster-struck regions possess more private information of borrowers than geographically
diversified banks. During the 2005 U.S. hurricane season, local banks, through loan sales,
could circumvent capital constraints and satisfy firms’ increased mortgage demands. Corte´s
and Strahan (2017) find that banks geographically reallocate funds when local credit demand
increases after natural disasters. Moreover, they find banks increase sales of more-liquid loans
to lessen the impact of the demand shock on credit supply. In this paper, rather than focusing
on the geographic distributions of assets, we propose that reallocation of resources within a
bank can also smooth its income and is beneficial to banks and the local community.
This emerging literature typically builds on models that were developed in the literature
on credit rationing. Allocating assets among customers of mixed types with various demands
is the bread-and-butter business of commercial banks. And indeed, the provision of credit is
so central to the health of the economy and the welfare of households that a large body of
research has been devoted to understanding banks’ lending behavior. At the micro level, the
formation of equilibrium contract rates and the resultant asset composition determine both
banks’ profitability and firms’ productivity. For example, the contraction of real estate loans
after the sub-mortgage crisis by most commercial banks dampened the real estate industry,
whereas banks’ supporting of loans after natural disasters with the assistance of governmental
agencies can accelerate recovery speeds. From the macro perspective, credit rationing is one of
the major sources of financial frictions that may significantly affect the effectiveness of fiscal
and monetary policies.2
2Theories of optimal portfolio choice can be dated back to Markowitz (1952), Merton (1969), and Samuelson
(1969). Theoretical microeconomic models to the optimal credit rationing literature are discussed in papers by
Porter (1962), Jaffee and Modigliani (1969), Klein (1970, 1971), Broaddus (1972), Pringle (1974), Sealey (1980),
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Still, most of the existing models consider the dynamics of a single aggregated asset rather
than the intertemporal interaction among multiple assets. Our paper is related to this literature
as we model the behavior of banks over time in response to exogenous shocks in a dynamic,
multiple asset setting.3 The need to study the dynamics of multiple assets stems from fact that
banks change not only the volume of loans but also the composition of their portfolio of assets.
The theoretical model in our paper is closely related to Collier (2014) who sets up a dynamic
lending model and evaluates the impact of disaster-related credit risk on the loan supply to
small enterprises. The model predicts that lenders suffer losses in their income and therefore
contract credit after big natural disasters, which is supported by data of a small business lender
in Peru after the severe El Nin˜o-related flooding of 1998. Instead of focusing on the payment
shock, our paper incorporates the demand side of loans, i.e. the production sector, and examines
the demand shock that follows natural disasters. In fact, the payment shock is caused by the
disaster shock to firms’ capital. By linking the payment shock and demand shock together, our
model becomes more general and helps us understand the behavior of both the demand and
supply sides.
Therefore we explicitly model both. The demand side includes responses of households,
government, and firms of varied industries. For firms especially, the demand for loans relies
greatly on their life cycle stage and on the region’s comparative advantages. On the supply
side, banks categorize their assets into cash, securities, and loans (e.g., real estate, commer-
cial and industrial, and household loans), and each category is subject to various regulatory
requirements.
Finally, we can relate this paper to the emerging literature on increasingly frequent and
more catastrophic climate related natural disasters.4
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), and Slovin and Sushka (1983). Works in macroeconomics in understanding the roles
of financial intermediaries include papers by Pagano (1993), Bernanke and Gertler (1989), Carlstrom and Fuerst
(1997), Iacoviello (2005), and Brunnermeier et al. (2012). Gorton and He (2008) model and test bank credit
cycles in the repeated game framework. For empirical studies of the lending behavior, see Hannan and Berger
(1991), Angbazo (1997), Asea and Blomberg (1998), Carling and Lundberg (2005), and Zecchini and Ventura
(2009).
3An early contribution that considers the intertemporal relationships among multiple categories of banks’
balance sheets is the paper by Broaddus (1972). Recent studies that incorporate large exogenous shocks are
papers by Chavaz (2014) and Collier (2014).
4See, for instance, Rietz (1988), Barro (2006, 2009, 2015), Gabaix (2008), Gourio (2012), and Wachter (2013)
who study rare economic disasters. Papers by Allen and Gale (2000), Acemoglu et al. (2015), and Sun (2016)
have made helpful progress in exploiting systematic and endogenous shocks.
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In conclusion, our contribution in this paper is to develop a multi-asset dynamic credit
rationing model that we use to make sense of the data and may simulate to assess the potential
impact of climate induced natural hazards on bank balance sheets and credit supply.
3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
To establish the stylized facts we are primarily interested in in this paper, we collect data on
individual banks’ balance sheet composition, the market prices for these asset categories and
data to identify which banks were in a region that was affected by a natural disaster. The
banks’ balance sheet items are from banks’ Call Reports, and the disaster records are from EM-
DAT (Guha-Sapir et al., 2015) and FEMA. We also collect the state-average interest rates from
Uniform Bank Performance Reports (UBPRs). In the next two subsections, we first discuss our
data collection procedure and then present descriptive statistics.
3.1 Data Collection
3.1.1 Balance Sheet Variables
We collect data on loans, securities, deposits, and equity are from the Call Reports of all
federally insured commercial banks in the United States. Our sample covers 45 quarters from
2002:Q4 to 2013:Q4 and includes 356,452 bank-level observations in total. From this source we
extract and compile loans secured by real estate, commercial and industrial loans, consumer
loans, federal government securities, total loans, total assets, and total equity.5
3.1.2 Interest Rates
The rates of returns on assets are not in the Call Reports but are recorded in the Uniform Bank
Performance Report (UBPR). The UBPRs collect variables at the state-level, so the rates are
the state averages. For example, UBPRs define the yield on real estate loans as the “interest
and fees on domestic office loans secured primarily by real estate, divided by average domestic
real estate loans.” In addition to interest rates, we obtain from the UBPRs the net loan loss
5The federal government securities include the U.S. Treasury securities and the U.S. Government agency
obligations. When we refer to “government security” or “government bond”, we mean the sum of these two
items. We do not, however, include the “local government securities” which are securities issued by states and
political subdivisions in the U.S. because these two types of securities have different interest rates according to
the Chapter “Noninterest Income, Expenses and Yields” of the UBPR.
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rates that are used to calibrate the non-repayment rates in the model. As individual bank
interest rates do not deviate from the state average, we model banks as price takers, so we
can assume interest rates for individual banks are more or less equal for all banks in a state.
Arbitrage ensures that interest rates are also highly correlated across bank asset types. We
plot the development of interest rates in Figure 7 in the Appendix. The Figure shows high
correlations among all types of assets and demonstrates that all interest rates indeed move
almost in parallel. It is thus reasonable for us to model the interest rate to be the sum of a
common prime lending rate determined by the production sector and a risk premium for specific
asset types.
3.1.3 Disasters
We gather disaster data from two sources. Our first data source is the EM-DAT, a comprehensive
dataset of disaster characteristics. The dataset includes the worldwide natural disasters of all
types and records the dates, human death toll, material damages, and geographic locations of
the disasters. We extract disasters in the U.S. from 2001 to 2013 and selected disasters whose
costs are in the top 5%, leaving to 86 disasters for the analysis. 6 We match the location
of each disaster with counties and classified counties into treatment and control groups in the
difference-in-difference (DID) analysis presented below.
We also looked at the disaster declaration records from the Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA) between 2000 and 2015. Each declaration item contains four variables: the
date, the state, the type of the disaster, and the declaration type. The types are not recorded
in a uniform manner. For instance, fires are often recorded together with the name of their
locations; hurricanes and tropical storms are used interchangeably; and floods are sometimes
recorded alone but occasionally recorded with other disasters such as winter storms or severe
storms. As the FEMA data are not as detailed and well-sorted as the EM-DAT data, we only
used them as a reference and to calculate the disaster probability for each state.
6The EM-DAT contains a lot of non-disasters, where damages and human impacts are very mild and would
not be considered a disaster. As it is not likely such non-events have significant impacts on local financial markets,
we chose to focus on the top 5%. Our results are thus representative for the more extreme events only.
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3.2 Descriptive Figures and Statistics
3.2.1 Bank Variables
To give an overall impression of our sample, we show summary statistics for the major bank
variables in Table 1. The Table includes the mean, standard deviation, 10th and 90th percentile
values at the bank-quarter level. To account for the effect of bank size, we divide banks into small
banks (Panel A) and large banks (Panel B) according to their total assets. The large standard
deviations in both panels indicate that the samples include heterogeneous banks across the
country. Furthermore, the statistics reveal that loans secured by real estate account for nearly
50 percent of the total assets. Since this type of loan is secured by real estate, it is considered
safer compared to other types of loans, which have either other kinds of collateral or no collateral
at all.7 Interestingly, small and large banks have rather similar real estate lending ratios, and
in general a fairly similar asset composition.
3.2.2 Disaster Frequency
By examining disaster records in both the EM-DAT and FEMA datasets, we find that, first,
natural disasters are very prevalent in the U.S.. There are, however, regional differences. In the
western territory, wildfires are the biggest natural threat, while in the gulf coast region, floods
and tropical storms are the most frequent hazards. Second, the costs of natural disasters are
highly skewed. As shown in the EM-DAT dataset, among the 1707 recored natural disasters
in the U.S. during 2001 and 2013, disasters that cause more than $1 billion in losses account
for only 3.51 percent, while zero-cost disasters are about 85.47 percent. Among these zero-cost
events, around 30.71% are wildfires and 20.08% are tornados. Among the top 5 percent most
costly disasters, around 90% are floods and hurricanes. Given that these disasters are prevalent
and they can affect a large area, we choose a radius of 200km to identify the affected counties
in our empirical analysis; this relatively large radius yields on average 50 affected counties in a
top 5% disaster.
To give a further impression about the type and frequency of disasters, we plot the following
figures based the FEMA disaster records. Figure 1 counts the number of declared “major
disasters” based on FEMA records from 2000 to 2015. The Figure indicates that the most
prevalent countrywide natural disaster is floods, whereas wildfires are the most common natural
disaster in states like Texas, California, and Wyoming.
7For a more detailed explanation on the role of collateral, see Gan (2007) and Chaney et al. (2012).
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Table 1: Key Statistics
This table displays statistics for variables using Call Reports data that cover all commercial banks in the United States.
All the variables are in millions of dollars. The mean, standard deviation, 10th percentile, and 90th percentile are based on
individual bank-quarter observations. To account for the effect of bank size, we group banks into small bank (Panel A) and
large bank (Panel B) groups according to their total assets. The medium of total assets is around $0.1 billion. Banks with
total assets less than $0.1 billion are classified as small banks whereas banks having assets between $0.1 and $9 billion are
large banks. We choose $9 billion as the upper limit because it is already beyond the 99.5th percentile and the remaining
values are treated as outliers.
Standard 10th 90th
Average Deviation Percentile Percentile Observations
Panel A: Small Banks (<$100 million in assets)
Total Assets 53.900 24.952 20.727 89.388 130908
Total Loan 32.814 19.114 9.449 60.563 130908
Real Estate Loan 21.047 15.383 4.043 43.424 130908
C&I Loan 5.025 4.982 0.745 11.027 130908
Individual Loan 2.821 2.985 0.425 6.135 130908
Government Securities 5.236 6.476 0 13.516 130908
Total Equity 6.389 4.000 2.352 10.691 130908
Deposit 37.569 18.555 13.422 63.323 130908
Panel B: Large Banks ($100-9000 million)
Total Assets 642.871 2666.346 116.679 991.604 177861
Total Loan 422.952 1860.527 70.209 669.344 177861
Real Estate Loan 287.145 1044.587 42.972 495.646 177861
C&I Loan 63.493 345.393 5.319 102.488 177861
Individual Loan 51.401 1050.935 1.110 32.859 177861
Government Securities 31.362 187.644 0 59.419 177861
Total Equity 68.837 361.937 11.114 99.477 177861
Deposit 395.771 1415.997 80.275 651.487 177861
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Figure 1: Counts of Natural Disaster Declarations (2000 to 2015). This figure displays the frequencies of each
one type of the five disasters for every state. The data includes disaster declarations available on the website of the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).
In addition, based on the major disaster declarations, we calculated a quarterly probability
of natural disasters for each state. For example, Louisiana has declared 20 major disasters
between 2000 and 2015, and therefore the average quarterly frequency of natural disasters is
20/(16× 4) = 31.25%. Figure 2 plots the histogram of disaster counts. Based on this graph, we
calculate the average quarterly disaster probability for each state to be about 22.85%. This value
will be used as the bank’s subjective perception of the disaster probability when we calibrate
the model.8
4 Empirical Analysis
In this section, we show how banks react to disaster-driven demand shocks. Consistent with
Corte´s (2017), we find that natural disasters lead banks to increase the amount of loans secured
by real estate and decrease holdings of government bonds. We also look at other types of assets
such as commercial and industrial loans, consumer loans, and total loans. We show decreases
in the amount of commercial loans, while consumer loans increase. Overall, the amount of
8Knowing the exact value of bank’s subjective disaster probability is impossible. We follow the common
practice in the disaster and business cycle literature by calculating the probability based on realized disasters
(Barro, 2006; Gabaix, 2008; Barro, 2009; Gourio, 2012; Wachter, 2013; Barro, 2015).
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Figure 2: Distribution of Quarterly Frequency of Major Disasters. This figure exhibits the histogram of quarterly
average frequencies of “major disasters” across different states and territories of the U.S.. The data comes from the FEMA.
Based on this histogram, we calculate the average disaster frequency to be 22.85%. This value will be used in our model
as the bank’s perceived disaster probability to calibrate the model.
total loans increases after natural disasters. In our baseline analysis, we choose a ±1 year event
window. We tested for other event windows for robustness and results are shown in the Internet
Appendix.
4.1 Identification and Methodology
To identify a causal effect of natural disasters on banks’ balance sheets, we rely on a difference-
in-difference (DID) analysis. That is, we identify the impact of a disaster by looking at the
difference between affected and non-affected banks in the change of balance sheet composition
over time. The implicit assumption is that all banks change their balance sheet in a similar
way in response to any common shocks over time. The impact of a disaster is then (on average)
equal to the (average) difference in this change. Our identification strategy relies on being able
to identify banks in our dataset that have and have not been affected by an event of known
location and intensity.
Closer inspection of our disaster data reveals that it contains a lot of events that one
would generally not consider disasters. To prevent these non-events from biasing and obscuring
the results we are interested in, we selected, admittedly somewhat arbitrarily, the most costly
5% recorded disasters in our EM-DAT data set. At that cut-off level we are left with 86
events affecting multiple counties in the 11 years (or 45 quarters) that our dataset spans. We
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choose these large-scale disasters to make sure that these disasters are ex-ante unpredictable and
exogenous. Arguably, firms and banks already have subjective beliefs about the risks in their
region and are therefore to some extent prepared for the more mundane events. In addition, only
relatively big disasters generate a significant and regionally correlated shock affecting productive
and residential capital of nearly all local firms and residents at the same time. Consequently,
only relatively large events can reasonably be assumed to cause significant loan defaults, an
increase in credit demand, and to drive up borrowing costs.
HERE Next, we need to distinguish between those banks that have been affected by a
disaster and those that have not been affected. We know the county in which a bank (or its
branch) is located as well as the county in which a disaster takes place. For each disaster, we
first create a group of “affected” and “unaffected” counties. We define a county to be affected by
a natural disaster if this county is located within a 200km radius of the recorded disaster center.
Since the actual impact of the disaster also depends on the shape of the flood plane, path of a
hurricane and area of wildfires - on which we lack information - this is likely to introduce some
noise in our measures. This noise, however, will mainly result in labelling as affected areas that
did not suffer damages, in which case the coefficients in the DID will be biased towards zero.
As a result, our DID tests are rather conservative.
Our control group of unaffected needs to be as similar as possible to the affected counties,
but without the impact of the disaster. We therefore define as unaffected counties located
between 300km and 400km radius of the disaster center. Again, in this group we may include
affected counties in for example the path of a hurricane or storm (floods rarely extend beyond
200km and wildfires never do). For our DID-analysis we thus ignore the banks in counties in
the 200-300km ring because it is ambiguous if they are affected or not, whereas we also ignore
those more than 500km removed from the disaster center, as these are less likely to experience
similar non-disaster related shocks. This grouping method leads to the number of affected and
unaffected counties to be around 50 each per event in our dataset. For each event, the banks
in the approximately 50 affected counties are then compared to the banks in the approximately
50 unaffected counties.
We then examine the average effect of all the selected events using the following empirical
model:
ybct = β0 + β1Affectedc × PostDatet + γXbct + CountyFE + TimeFE + bct, (1)
where ybct represents the quantity of an asset of bank b located in county c at quarter-year t.
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Affected equals 1 if a county is affected, and 0 otherwise. PostDate equals 1 if the observation
date t is after the end date of the event recorded in the EM-DAT. The county fixed effects and
time fixed effects capture unobservable regional traits and macroeconomic conditions that may
confound with disaster-driven demand shocks. In line with Koetter et al. (2016), we control
in Xbct for bank-specific variables including bank size (total assets), capital adequacy (total
equity/total assets) and liquidity (non interest bearing cash/total assets).
4.2 Results of DID
We present the baseline results of our DID analysis in Table 2. We divided banks into small and
large banks to reduce the possible distortion effect of bank size. In the current baseline results,
we use a ±1 year event window centered on the date of the disaster. We thus compare the
average bank located within a 200km radius of the reported centre of the event to an average
bank located between 300 and 400km from that same point.
Our results show affected banks increase real estate lending and decrease holdings of gov-
ernment securities after disasters, which is consistent with Corte´s (2017). The coefficients are
both statistically and economically significant. For example, small banks in the affected coun-
ties on average increase real estate lending by $0.961 million more than those in unaffected
counties. Given the average amount of real estate loans of $21.047 million, as shown in Table 1,
this is a 4.6% increase. Meanwhile, large banks increase their real estate loans by $2.71 million,
which is a 1% increase compared to the average amount. This is less, but given larger volumes,
still very significant. As for government bonds, small and large banks decrease their holdings
by $0.227 and $1.025 million respectively, corresponding to a 4.3% and 3.3% decrease from the
average level. In a recent study by Schu¨wer et al. (2018), using Hurricane Katrina as a natural
experiment, the authors also found significant decreases in government bond holdings of affected
banks.
In addition, we find that banks increase their credit supply to households and individuals
(i.e. consumer loans) and decrease lending to the commercial and industrial sector. In the
±1 year event window setting, these results are not statistically significant. However, when we
increase the event window to ±3 years, as show in Table 3, we find significant coefficients for
both types of loans, especially for small banks and the results for real estate loans, government
securities, and total loans remain robust.
Finally, the net effect turns out to be an increase in total loans. The net increase is smaller
than the increase in real estate loans, however, due to the decrease in commercial lending. Our
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findings indicate that big natural hazards have long-term impact on bank asset structure, and
small banks are more sensitive to adverse events than large banks, possibly because they are
geographically less diversified than large banks Corte´s and Strahan (2017). 9
In the next section, we provide a theoretical model to explain our two main empirical
findings. First, our model captures the fact that disasters stimulate communities’ demand for
loans for reconstruction by destroying capital. Therefore, banks extend credit and meanwhile sell
government bonds to finance such a increase in demand. Second, by assuming that disasters lead
to more defaults of commercial loans than real estate and consumer loans, our model explains
why real estate lending increases yet commercial lending decreases after natural disasters.
5 Theoretical Model
In this section, we first set up a theoretical model to explain banks’ asset allocation behavior
during disastrous times. Next we calibrate the parameters of the model and compare key
financial ratios implied by the model with real data. This comparison shows that our model is
able to reproduce the data reasonably well and sets the stage for the simulation of a natural
disaster and climate change scenarios in the next sections.
We begin with a single asset model to introduce our main variables and show how banks
make lending decisions based on loan conditions, disaster probability, and interest rate (model
1). Next, we allow for multiple assets, which enables us to generate interactions among assets
when a disaster strikes (model 2). Our model contains two economic agents: banks and firms,
that represent the supply and demand side of funds, respectively. Collectively, firms have
an infinite demand at a market borrowing interest rate that is determined by the marginal
productivity of capital in production and investment. Individual banks then decide how much
to lend, based on this interest rate. A disaster is modeled to destroy firms’ capital, increasing the
marginal productivity of capital, the borrowing interest rate, and possibly the non-repayment
rates of existing loans. Individual banks are assumed to aim at maximizing shareholder value
and endogenously react to this shock by adjusting their asset structure. The single asset banking
model is mainly based on the model of Collier (2014). In the next subsections we first present
their basic setup, then add the production sector in the one-asset model and finally extend this
to a multi-asset setting.
9We try different event windows in the Internet Appendix. As we extend the event window, the negative
coefficient on commercial loans and positive coefficient on consumer loans become more significant.
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5.1 Basic Model Setup
Following Collier (2014) we introduce a risk-neutral bank that maximizes its shareholder value
over an infinite horizon. Every period, the bank generates new aggregated loans Lt, but only
a fraction, L˜t, are paid back at the end of the period due to default.
10 We model such a
relationship as:
L˜t = (1− ξt)Lt, (2)
where ξt is the non-repayment rate that is affected by various types of shocks, including natural
disasters. It is specified as:
ξt = ξ¯ + 
ξ
t , (3)
where ξt captures unexpected shocks and ξ¯ represents the bank’s expected non-repayment rate:
ξ¯ = p(µ+ ξ∗) + (1− p)µ = µ+ pξ∗, (4)
where µ represents the non-repayment rate in normal times, ξ∗ is the average non-repayment
rate increment when a disaster happens, and the bank expects the disaster to happen (xt=1)
with a probability p. We introduce this probability here to simulate different scenarios of climate
change using different values of disaster probability p in the sections below. For now, it suffices
to note that a higher disaster probability implies a higher expected non-repayment rate.
The net income, Rt, is the interest income of performing loans, rtL˜t less the deposit interest
payment, rDt Dt, the origination costs for new loans h(lt), and the loan losses ξtLt, yielding:
Rt = rtL˜t − rDt Dt − h(Lt)− ξtLt, (5)
where rt and r
D
t are the interest rates on loans and deposits respectively. We specify rt as:
rt = r
∗
t + κ, (6)
with r∗t is the equilibrium basic lending rate determined on the production side, introduced below
and κ is the risk premium of the loan. In Collier (2014)’s model, the basic borrowing/lending
interest rate rt is a given parameter. In our model, however, we let it to be determined by the
10Since Lt is the stock variable, it would be more precise to include a motion equation, Lt+1 = Lt + lt, where
lt is the newly issued loans, a flow variable. The latter then represents a choice variable, as banks determine how
many new loans they issue every period. However, it is in fact equivalent to assume that the bank decides on
total outstanding loans Lt every period. The model will produce exactly the same result whether we specify the
motion equation or not. More importantly, since our empirical analysis tests the stock, not flow, of loans, letting
the bank decide the level of Lt makes the theory consistent with the empirical analysis.
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production sector to introduce a second channel through which natural disasters can enter the
banks’ decision making. By destroying capital, natural disasters increase loan demand as well as
the interest rate. Banks then make decisions based on the changed conditions of the economy.
This improvement makes our mechanism more elaborate and realistic.11 We can relate deposit
Dt to the interest rate r
D
t and a constant N that controls the size of the balance sheet:
12
Dt = N(1 + r
D
t ) (7)
Consequently, the total loans that the bank can generate is constrained by the balance
sheet identity:
Lt = Dt + Et (8)
As a bank generates more loans, it faces origination costs associated with searching, evalu-
ating, and monitoring borrowers as well as more severe regulation on leverage from authorities.
A convenient cost function to reflect that process is:
h(Lt) = ηLt +
ψ
2
L2t , (9)
where the linear component implies that origination costs are proportional to the amount of
loans, whereas the quadratic part captures the fact that for a bank that already has issued a lot
of loans, it becomes more difficult to search, evaluate, and monitor new borrowers and meets
increasingly invasive interventions from the banking authorities when its leverage becomes too
high.13 The next period’s equity is the current equity less dividend payments plus income:
Et+1 = (1− ν)Et +Rt, (10)
11From an empiricist’s point of view, the interest rate is persistent. Especially for loans, both banks and
customers can not change the rate whenever they want, so the interest rate in the next period is highly correlated
with the rate of the last period. This calls for a more realistic interest rate process, for example, rt = ρrt−1 +
(1− ρ)r¯t + rt , where ρ represents the persistence of the interest rate and t ∼ N(0, σ2) is a random shock. In the
later simulation part, to conform to reality and also to improve the readability of graphs, we set ρ > 0, which
means banks continue to charge a higher interest rate some quarters after the disaster. To keep the exposition
of the model clean, however, we set ρ = 0 here.
12This is also an extension compared to Collier (2014)’s model that simply set deposits to be the difference
between asset and equity. In this way, we can add a shock to the deposits when we have reasons to believe that
households and banks react to disasters by withdrawing deposits or changing the deposit rate. We will not dwell
on this experiment here, however, for two reasons. First, we want to focus on the topic of banks’ asset allocation
rather than how banks adjust their deposit rate.Dlugosz et al. (2018) study in detail how banks’ decision-making
delegation affects their ability to set deposit rate and the consequence of deposit level and economic recovery.
Second, we did not find robustly significant empirical evidence on the change of deposit after disasters.
13In Collier (2014), the author explicitly models the regulation cost as a step function that stays at zero when
the leverage is low and increases when the leverage exceeds the regulation threshold. We smooth this process in
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where ν is the dividend rate. Finally, the bank’s problem is maximizing its overall dividend
payment discounted by a time discount factor γ:
max
Lt
Π0 =
∞∑
t=0
γtE[νEt], 0 < γ < 1. (11)
To complete the model, we need to introduce the demand side for loans, that is the pro-
duction sector. We assume a mass of price-taking banks and firms, such that the demand for
a single bank’s loans is infinite at the market-determined interest rate and this rate must be
equal to firms’ marginal productivity of capital.
5.2 Introducing Firms
As a disaster affects the whole economy in an affected location, we should consider both the
financial and non-financial sectors. We will let firms as a whole to determine the basic borrowing
interest rate through production and investment; individual banks then decide how much to
lend based on the given interest rate. We model firms based on a business cycle model of Gourio
(2012); they produce output using a Cobb-Douglas production function:
Yt = AK
α
t , (12)
where A is productivity level, also known as the total factor productivity (TFP). Capital is
accumulated according to the law of motion for production capital:
Kt+1 = (1− δt)Kt + φ
( It
Kt
)
Kt, (13)
where δt is depreciation rate, It is the demand for funds, and φ
(
It
Kt
)
is a function describing
capital adjustment costs.14 A disaster can now be introduced into the model as a sudden
increase in the capital depreciation rate:
δt = δ¯ + 
δ
t . (14)
If δt and 
ξ
t are positively correlated, then this means disasters indeed lead to defaults of existing
loans. Finally, firms maximize profit over time according to:
max
It,Kt+1
ΠFirm0 =
∞∑
t=0
βtE[Yt − It − r∗tKt], 0 < β < 1, (15)
this specification as the kinked function complicates the numerical computations below and is not important to
our model’s main mechanism.
14Here we follow the convention of business cycle literature and specify the capital adjustment function to be
φ( It
Kt
) = It
Kt
− ι
2
( It
Kt
− δ)2. It is therefore an increasing and concave function.
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where β is the time discount factor for firms. Through their production and investment decisions,
firms collectively determine the basic borrowing interest rate:
1 + r∗t = φ
′
( It
Kt
)(1− δt + φ( It+1Kt+1 )
φ′( It+1Kt+1 )
+ α
Yt+1
Kt+1
− It+1
Kt+1
)
. (16)
Equation (16) shows that if disasters increase the depreciation rate of firm capital, this endoge-
nously drives up the interest rate and by assumption affects the non-repayment rate, such that
they eventually lead banks to adjust their capital structure. The model, however, still cannot
explain the interactions among different asset types after disasters. For this, we need to make
a further extension to incorporate multiple assets.
5.3 Bank with Multiple Assets
Having established the single-asset model, we can slightly enrich the model to allow for interac-
tions among multiple assets.15 Note that each asset now has its own non-repayment rate (zero
for government bonds), interest rate and cost function. The net income then includes the sum
of interest income of all assets:
Rt =
n∑
i=1
ritL˜it − rDt D − h(Lt)−
n∑
i=1
ξitLit, (17)
where i indexes the asset class and n is the number of assets. and
rit = r
∗
t + κi, (18)
where the bank’s lending rate rit for asset i is the sum of the basic borrowing/lending rate r
∗
t
and the risk premium κi of that asset. The total costs for the bank are then given by the sum
of individual costs:16
h(Lt) =
n∑
i=1
ηiLit +
ψi
2
L2it. (19)
Finally, the balance sheet identity becomes:
n∑
i=1
Lit = Dt + Et. (20)
With these simple extensions, model 2 now captures the important trade-off among assets.
In the following two propositions, we first look at the impact of the interest rate on the level of
total loans and then illustrate the trade-off among only two assets.
15In the quantitative analysis, we looked at four distinct asset classes, i.e. loans secured by real estate,
commercial and industrial loans, consumer loans, and government securities.
16We allow for different levels of asset-specific origination costs. The purchase of a government security in the
market is likely to involve significantly lower costs than the origination of a new commercial loan.
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5.4 Steady State and Propositions
The two models allow us to derive the steady state equilibrium in which the following proposi-
tions hold:
Proposition 1: The level of total loans increases with the interest rate and decreases with the
non-repayment rate and disaster probability.
Proof: At the steady state, the level of aggregated loans L is a constant and the interest
rate and non-repayment rate equal to their mean values r¯ and ξ¯. Solving the steady states of
model 1, we find:
L =
[(1− ξ¯)r − η − ξ¯ − ν] +
√
[(1− ξ¯)r − η − ξ¯ − ν]2 − 2ψ(rD − ν)D
ψ
. (21)
After taking the first derivatives, we have ∂L∂r¯ > 0,
∂L
∂ξ¯
< 0, and ∂L∂p < 0. Therefore, the amount
of loans is positively related to the interest rate and negatively related to the non-repayment
rate. More detailed derivations are shown in our Internet Appendix.
This proposition is straightforward. The first part follows the law of demand and supply.
As for the second part, when banks face higher default risks, thus a higher non-repayment rate
or a higher disaster probability, to guarantee a stable income and shareholder value, banks tend
to be more prudent in issuing loans.
Proposition 2: If a bank has two assets and one asset has an increase in interest rate, the
bank will increase the holding of this asset and decrease the holding of another one.
Proof: Solving the steady states of model 2, we find:
L1 =
[(1− ξ¯1)r1 − η1 − ξ¯1]− [(1− ξ¯2)r2 − η2 − ξ¯2] + ψ2(D + E)
ψ1 + ψ2
. (22)
The level of one asset is positively related to its own interest rate but is negatively related to
the interest rate of another asset. That is ∂L1∂r¯1 > 0 while
∂L1
∂r¯2
< 0. Therefore, when a disaster
increases the demand and the interest rate of one asset (e.g., mortgage loans), facing its budget
constraint, a bank will decrease the holdings of another asset (e.g., government securities). We
include detailed derivations in our Internet Appendix.
These propositions and the corresponding proofs state the main results of our theoretical
model. In the following subsection we will calibrate our model parameters and illustrate these
two propositions more vividly with impulse response graphs.
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5.5 Calibration and Simulation
We calibrate the model using quarterly data for commercial banks. Some values are calculated
direct from real data; others are chosen such that the steady-state values of our key financial
variables match the average data statistics. Table 4 summarizes the calibrated parameters for
our two models.
The non-repayment rate of an outstanding loan equals one less the loan’s net loss rate. For
each type of loan, the net loss is reported in the UBPR as year-to-date (YTD) net loss.17 In
our calibration, we use one minus the mean of a loan’s net loss divided by the notional amount
as the expected value of the non-repayment rate (ξ¯). We manually assign the non-repayment
rate of government securities to be zero.
The time discount factors for banks and firms, γ and β, are both set to be 0.95, which is a
standard value used in the literature. To determine the risk premium for each bank asset, we
first take the average of each asset’s interest rates over time and across states and use this value
as the interest rate (name it as r¯i) of this asset. As at the equilibrium, the basic borrowing rate
determined by firms is simply r∗ = 1/β − (1− δ¯), we calibrate the risk premium for each asset
as κ = r¯i − (1/β − (1− δ¯)). The data are from the UBPR.
The cost parameters are chosen to match certain financial ratios between our model and
the data, as can be seen in the next subsection. Other parameters are also calibrated to match
the ratios of key variables. For example, the scale constant N determines the level of deposits
and therefore the size of the balance sheet. The dividend rate is based on the return on average
equity for all U.S. banks from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
Table 4 shows that real estate loans have the highest credit quality among the three types
of loans, as indicated by the fact that it has the lowest average non-repayment rate. Every
quarter, the default rate for real estate loans is around 0.5%. The commercial and industrial
loans have the lowest credit quality with an average non-repayment rate of 3%. This difference
reflects the role of collateral in promoting the timely repayment of loans and validates why real
estate lending is the biggest lending business of banks (Gan, 2007; Chaney et al., 2012).
Having these calibrated parameters in hand, we show our model can generate key financial
ratios that are close to real data. We can now examine the model’s quantitative performance.
17The UBPR codes for the total loan, real estate loan, C&I loan, and the consumer loan are UBPSE019,
UBPSE397, UBPSE408, and UBPSE410 respectively. Since the “year-to-date net loss” refers to the cumulative
loss so far this year, to calculate the quarterly net loss of a loan, we need to subtract the value of the YTD net
loss in the current quarter by the value of the YTD net loss in the last quarter.
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Table 4: Calibrated Parameters
This table reports our calibrated parameters. The interest rate premium and components of non-repayment rates are based
on the average interest rate and non-repayment rate reported in the Uniform Bank Performance Report (UBPR). We have
data on real estate loans (labeled as RS), commercial and industrial loans (CI), and consumer loans (CS). Since the net
losses data for the government securities are not available, we set the non-repayment rate of government securities (GS) to
be zero. We fix the interest rates on deposit and government bond and let the interest rates of other assets to be the sum
of the basic equilibrium rate and their corresponding risk premium. Parameters that cannot directly be calculated from
the data are calibrated to match the data moments such as the capital ratio and the relative ratios among different assets.
Model 1 Model 2
Concept Symbol Total Loans RS CI CS GS Calibration Method
Normal time non-repayment
rate (%)
µ 2 0.5 2 3 0 match UBPR data
Disaster time non-repayment
rate (%)
ξ∗ 1 2 2 2 0 match UBPR data
Mean interest rate (%) r¯ 6.78 6.65 6.93 8.14 3.39 interest rate data from UBPR
Risk premium (%) κ 1.52 1.39 1.67 2.88 - κ = r¯ − (1/β − (1− δ¯))
Cost (linear component) (%) η 1 0.5 0.1 0.1 0.5 match data moments
Cost (quadratic component)
(%)
ψ 0.01 0.2 0.5 0.7 0.5 match data moments
Time preference bank γ 0.95 0.95 standard value
Scale constant of deposit N 20 20 match data moments
Dividend rate (%) ν 15 15 average ROE for all U.S.
Banks from Federal Reserve
Bank of St. Louis
Deposit interest rate (%) rD 2.02 2.02 interest rate data from UBPR
Persistence of interest rate
(%)
ρ 0.4 0.4 standard value
Time preference firm β 0.95 0.95 standard value
Total factor productivity A 1 1 a scale constant; value does
not affect the results
Capital share α 0.33 0.33 standard value
Depreciation rate (%) δ 2 2 standard value for quarterly
depreciation rate
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We first compare some key financial ratios generated by the model with ratios based on real
data. Next, we carry out simulations to examine the effects of changes in asset prices after
disasters.
5.6 Data versus Model Moments
In Table 5, we show the statistics of key financial ratios. The left panel shows ratios calculated
based on the Call Reports data of U.S. commercial banks. To avoid extreme values caused by
banks’ size, we select banks with total assets between the 25th and 75th quantiles. Ratios in
the right panel are based on our numerical model simulations. The simulated values are the
average statistics derived from Monte Carlo simulations, drawing random realisations of the
capital depreciation shock (δt ) distribution. Each of the 5,000 simulations has 45 observations
as our real data covers 45 quarters. The mean and median of the capital ratio indicated by the
real data are 10.7% and 9.9% respectively. For the simulated capital ratio, the mean value is
9.4% in model 1 and 11.3% in model 2; both are reasonable values compared to the real data.
The Table shows that except for the capital ratio, other financial ratios vary greatly across
banks, which confirms the diversity of bank business models. Given the huge deviations in the
real data, the ratios generated by our model are all in the reasonable domain.
Table 5: Statistical Moments: Data vs. Model
This table shows the statistical moments based on the real data and the simulated values of the models. The data are
from the Call Reports with time horizon from 2002 to 2013. To avoid extreme values caused by the size factor, we select
banks with total assets between the 25th and 75th quantiles and calculate the means, medians, and standard deviations
of financial ratios of interest. One the left panel, simulated values are the average statistics derived from a Monte Carlo
simulation based on the shock distribution of the capital depreciation rate. We set the standard deviation of δt to be 0.01,
which is almost a 50% variation compared to the mean value of δ, which is 0.02. As our real data covers 45 quarters, we
let each of our 5,000 simulations to have 45 observations.
Data Model
Mean Median Std.Dev Mean Median Std.Dev
Model 1
Equity/Total Loans 0.107 0.099 0.042 0.094 0.093 0.017
Equity/Deposit 0.527 0.141 33.199 0.101 0.100 0.020
Model 2
Equity/Total Loans 0.107 0.099 0.042 0.113 0.113 0.013
Equity/Deposit 0.527 0.141 33.199 0.125 0.125 0.016
Loan CI/loan RS 0.317 0.188 5.022 0.275 0.275 0.119
Loan HH/loan RS 0.235 0.078 7.933 0.206 0.206 0.086
Gov. securities/loan RS 0.296 0.115 2.308 0.050 0.050 0.045
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To further reduce concerns that the previously simulated financial ratios are sensitive to
the choice of parameter values, we perform a number of sensitivity tests. In particular, we select
the parameters that cannot be directly inferred from real data and for which empirical evidence
is scarce. These parameters include the components in the cost function (η and ψ), the time
preferences of bank and firm (γ and β), and the constant scale parameter N that determines the
size of the balance sheet. We increase or decrease them by 10% respectively and compare the
key financial ratios with the medians of the baseline model and real data. Our results in Table 6
show that the simulated moments are not sensitive to the exact values of the parameters we
use. Only the ratio of government bonds to real estate loans, with a drop of 7%, seems sensitive
to these changes, but compared to the baseline simulation, this is still within the reasonable
domain compared to real data. Other ratios change only slightly.18
Table 6: Sensitivity Test of Model Parameters
This table presents results of the sensitivity test of selected model parameters. We choose parameters that cannot be
directly inferred from real data as they may suffer from some subjective arbitrariness. These parameters include η, ψ, γ,N
and β. We increase or decrease them by 10% and compare the key financial ratios with the medians of the baseline model
and real data.
Data Baseline Parameter +10% Parameter -10%
Equity/Total Loans 0.099 0.093 0.084 0.102
Equity/Deposit 0.141 0.100 0.089 0.111
Equity/Total Loans 0.099 0.113 0.091 0.132
Equity/Deposit 0.141 0.126 0.099 0.149
Loan CI/loan RS 0.188 0.272 0.295 0.252
Loan HH/loan RS 0.078 0.205 0.220 0.191
Gov. securities/loan RS 0.115 0.093 0.069 0.029
Up to this point, we have set up our model, derived its static implications, calibrated the
model to match the data and have shown that these calibrations are not particularly sensitive
to any of the parameters in our model. To now see how our model can explain and justify
banks’ dynamic asset adjustment behavior, we simulate the effect of a natural disaster in the
next section.
18Since in model 2, cost parameters η and ψ are vectors, we can change values for each individual element
rather than uniformly increase or decrease values by 10%. We did try 10% deviations for each individual element
and the results remain robust.
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6 Simulation of a Disaster
In this part, we simulate the effect of a natural disaster that is assumed to destroy production
capital and by proposition 1 stimulate the demand for loans; the interest rate then increases
as a result of the reduced capital stock and increased investment need. We explore how these
changes can affect a bank’s asset allocation. In both model 1 and model 2, we simulate a 1%
increase in the capital depreciation rate. We use a 1% change in the capital depreciation rate
as an example because the quarterly capital depreciation rate is 2% according to the literature
(Bachmann et al., 2013); therefore, a 1% change can proxy a large shock induced by a rare
disaster as included in our empirical analysis. Our model in this study provides one explanation
among many about banks’ asset allocation behavior; we do not, however, intend to match every
simulated number exactly with the empirical findings.
For model 1, as shown in Figure 3, the capital level drops after a disaster. Firms’ marginal
productivity of capital increases and they need more investment to restore production, so the
lending rate increases. In response to these changes, the bank increases its origination of total
loans by about 0.8% (the red curve). As a result, the bank earns more interest income and
increases its equity level by about 8%. Furthermore, the bank boosts its capital adequacy by
more than 0.5%. In brief, as the bank extends new credit, our model implies a positive role
for commercial banks in supporting the economic recovery. But of course a natural disaster
is not only a positive shock to firms’ depreciation rates. It also affects their ability to service
outstanding debt (negatively) and thereby affects the ability and willingness of banks to issue
new loans.
In a more realistic scenario, we therefore assume the depreciation rate and the non-
repayment rate to be correlated. That is, a disaster destroys firm capital, interrupts production,
and leads to delayed loan payment or even a default. If we assume that a 1% increase in de-
preciation rate is associated with a 0.5% increase in the non-repayment rate, then, as indicated
by the green curves, banks will generate fewer new loans and all other variables increase to a
lower amount compared to the previous case.
Figure 4 shows the effects of a disaster on different assets based on model 2. The impact of
the disaster on the production sector is the same as for model 1. The difference is that, when
we consider multiple assets, we see the bank increases the origination of all types of loans as
the interest rates increase, but at the same time decreases its holdings of government bonds.
Specifically, our model implies a roughly 4% increase in every type of loan and a 60% decrease in
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Figure 3: Effects of a 1% Increase in the Capital Depreciation Rate on Loan Orig-
ination, Equity, Capital Ratio (or Equity Ratio), and Income (Model 1).
This figure shows the percentage deviations of loans, equity, income, firm capital, and interest rate from their steady states
and the change in the capital ratio if the capital depreciation rate δ increase by 1% after a disaster based on model 1. The
green lines represent the case when the depreciation rate and non-repayment rate ξ are correlated; we assume that a 1%
increase in depreciation rate is associated with a 0.5% increase in the non-repayment rate. The previous five periods (i.e.
-5 to -1) are interpolated as peaceful periods to improve the readability of the figure.
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government securities. Such a reallocation compares well with our empirical findings. Our model
consistently predict increases in real estate and consumer lending and decreases in government
securities.
There are, however, two differences. The first is related to the change of commercial loans.
As indicated by our empirical findings so far, banks decrease the origination of commercial
loans after disasters whereas the simulation here implies an increase. This is because we did not
consider the correlation between the depreciation and non-repayment rate so far. As commercial
loans are riskier than real estate loans and are more prone to disaster-related defaults, the non-
repayment rate may increase after disasters, especially for this category of assets. We show in
the Internet Appendix that when a 1% increase in the capital depreciation rate is associated
with 0.5% increase in the non-repayment rate in the commercial loan, both the direction and
magnitude of the changes in loans are in line with our empirical findings.
The second difference concerns the magnitude of the change in government bonds. The
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Figure 4: Effects of a 1% Increase in the Capital Depreciation Rate on Bank Assets,
Equity, Capital Ratio, and Income (Model 2). This figure shows the percentage deviations of bank
assets and income from their steady states if the capital depreciation rate δ increase by 1% after a disaster based on model
2. The abbreviations RS, CI, and CS mean real estate loans, commercial and industrial loans, and consumer loans. The
previous five periods (i.e. -5 to -1) are interpolated as peaceful periods to improve the readability of the figure.
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simulation implies quite a large (60%) drop while the empirical findings reveal the drop to
be around 4%. As we have stated, in this study we highlight banks’ use of an internal asset
diversification strategy in response to disasters. Banks of course can have many other solutions
to endure disasters. In previous research, Corte´s and Strahan (2017) have shown that banks
adjust lending between affected and unaffected regions. If banks use many strategies to cope
with disasters, then the drop in the holdings of government bonds will be smaller. Also, in the
data, the responses of other banks and the central bank may play a role in maintaining funding
for banks in affected counties. Nevertheless, the gap to be explained here, remains large, and
is likely to be the result of the fact that we allow no other way for banks to accommodate the
shock from a natural disaster other than through asset reallocation.
We conclude that with a dynamic multiple-asset credit rationing model, we can explain
why and how banks adjust their asset structure in response to natural hazards. By strategically
(re)allocating assets, banks not only meet the increased loan demand of the local community,
but also guarantee a stable income and shareholder value for themselves. In the next section,
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we go a step further by looking at the impact of climate change on banks’ asset structure.
7 Does Climate Change Affect Banks’ Asset Structure?
So far, we have explored the impact of the realization of a disaster, given the setup of our
model, as calibrated to the data. In the final part of our analysis, we study what happens if the
probability of a disaster happening changes, as a result of climate change. As has been predicted
by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), global warming can increase the
chance of natural hazards, especially floods and hurricanes that accounts for a large portion of
the disaster sample in our empirical analysis (Pachauri et al., 2014). Therefore, we present four
scenarios of permanent changes of disaster probability, i.e. +10%, +5%, -5%, and -10%.19
As shown in Figure 5, consistent with Proposition 1 in our static analysis, model 1 implies
that an increase in disaster probability leads to decreased loan origination, income, equity. This
is because higher disaster probability means higher expected non-repayment rate and lower
income and shareholder value. As a result, banks generate less credit. Since equity decreases
more than loans, the capital ratio also decreases. Therefore, our model implies that climate
change not only reduces banks’ ability of issuing credit, but also affects banks’ stability since
they maintain less capital.
As for model 2, consistent with Proposition 1, Figure 6 shows that a higher disaster prob-
ability leads to a lower level of all types of loans. However, in line with Proposition 2, banks
increase the holdings of government bonds. This is because government bonds have a zero non-
repayment rate that is independent of the disaster risk and are therefore a safer asset compared
to loans. Similar to the predictions of model 1, in model 2, banks’ income, equity, and capital
ratio also decrease in response to climate change induced increased probabilities of disaster.
To sum up, by assuming different changes in disaster probability due to climate change, our
model shows that profit maximizing banks will increase their holdings of government securities
and reduce their loans to firms and households. This is detrimental to their income and ulti-
mately their reserve and equity ratios. Climate change thus hinders banks’ capacity of issuing
credit to productive investment and reduces banks’ capital adequacy, reducing investment and
negatively affecting financial stability.
19We included the negative shocks to verify that our model is symmetric in its response to the change in
perceived natural disaster probabilities.
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Figure 5: Effects of Different Permanent Shocks to Disaster Probability. In this figure, we assume four different
scenarios about the change of disaster probability. We assume permanent changes of quarterly disaster probability to be
+10%, +5%, -5%, and -10% respectively. We have scenarios of increased probability because climate change can increase
the chance of natural disasters. We also show scenarios of decreased probability to compare them with the implications of
climate change.
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Figure 6: Effects of Different Permanent Shocks to Disaster Probability. In this figure, we assume four different
scenarios about the change of disaster probability. We assume permanent changes of quarterly disaster probability to be
+10%, +5%, -5%, and -10% respectively. We have scenarios of increased probability because climate change can increase
the chance of natural disasters. We also show scenarios of decreased probability to compare them with the implications of
climate change.
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8 Conclusion
This paper examines how banks strategically reallocate their assets when natural disasters
stimulate the demand for loans as was found in previous literature. In the empirical analysis,
we find that natural disasters affect banks’ asset structure. The changes are both statistically
and economically significant. Specifically, banks increase loans secured by real estate and sell
government securities to finance the increased demand for credit. Further, after a disaster small
banks experience larger fluctuations in the level of assets than large banks, since the former
have tighter budget constraints and/or less flexibility of diversifying assets internally.
In the theoretical part, we then develop a multiple-asset dynamic credit rationing model
to explain these empirical findings. Our model includes both the supply and demand side
and it illustrates how profit maximizing banks will respond to natural disasters as well as to
changing underlying risks that can be linked to climate change. The model captures banks’
asset allocation behavior found in the empirical analysis and has important implications for
the debate on the economic impacts of climate change. First, our simulations show that higher
risks of natural disaster will erode banks ability and willingness to give credit to local firms.
In anticipation of more frequent and more serious weather related disasters, banks will show a
rational ‘flight to safety’ investing more in low yielding government securities. Such behavior is
individually rational, as banks anticipate interest rate hikes in post disaster investment booms,
but in the long run, this will erode their capital base and financial stability in disaster prone
areas. The only good news in our climate change scenarios is that governments will be able
to finance deficits resulting from financial crises and natural disaster relief more cheaply. We
believe, however, that both banks and society would benefit if credit allocation remains a for-
profit business and banks are not forced not retreat from what is their core business. Preventing
climate change would of course be a first best solution, but if adaptation is required, a natural
disaster relief fund or loan insurance schemes could be considered.
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Appendix
Table 7: Terminology
This table presents definitions of all the terminologies related to natural disasters and banking variables used through out
the paper as well as their abbreviations. The definitions of the banking variables can be found in the instructions of the
Call Reports compiled by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC).
Natural disaster A natural disaster is a major adverse event resulting from natural processes of the
Earth; examples include floods, volcanic eruptions, earthquakes, tsunamis, and other
geologic processes. A natural disaster can cause loss of life or property damage, and
typically leaves some economic damage in its wake, the severity of which depends on
the affected population’s resilience, or ability to recover.1
Loans secured by real estate (RS) A loan secured by real estate is a loan that, at origination, is secured wholly or
substantially by a lien or liens on real property for which the lien or liens are central
to the extension of the credit – that is, the borrower would not have been extended
credit in the same amount or on terms as favorable without the lien or liens on real
property.
Commercial and industrial loans
(CI)
Loans for commercial and industrial purposes to sole proprietorships, partnerships,
corporations, and other business enterprises, whether secured (other than those
that meet the definition of a “loan secured by real estate”) or unsecured, single-
nonrepayment or instalment.2
Consumer loans (CS) In this category, a bank will report all its credit extended to individual for household,
family, and other personal expenditures that does not meet the definition of the
loans secured by real estate. It includes credit cards, other revolving credit plans,
automobile loans, and other consumer loans.
Government securities (GS) This variable is a combination of two categories in the call report: 1) U.S. Treasury
securities: amortized cost and fair value of all U.S. Treasury securities not held in
trading accounts. It should include all bills, certificates of indebtedness, notes, and
bonds. 2) U.S. Government agency obligations: the amortized cost and fair value
of all U.S. Government agency obligations not held for trading. But the mortgage-
backed securities are excluded.3
Interest-bearing deposits (DP) Interest-bearing deposits accounts consist of deposits accounts on which the issuing
depository institution makes any nonrepayment to or for the account of any depositor
as compensation for the use of funds constituting a deposits.
Loans Net Losses (%) The year-to-date net loss (change offs less recoveries) for the gross (or a specific type
of) loans divided by average gross (or a specific type of) loans.4
1 This definition is from Wikipedia-Natural Disaster.
2 The Loan and Lease part, schedule RC-C has two parts, the second of which is “Loans to Small Businesses and Small
Farms”. But the first part already includes the second part.
3 The definitions of the above bank assets are from each individual schedules of the Reports of Condition and Income
Instruction Book (Updated June 2015).
4 Year-to-date (YTD) net loss refers to the loss so far this year. To calculate the net loss in the 3rd quarter, we need to
subtract the value of 3rd quarter YTD net loss by the value of 2nd quarter YTD net loss.
38
F
ig
u
r
e
7
:
In
te
r
e
st
R
a
te
s
o
n
L
o
a
n
s
a
n
d
S
e
c
u
r
it
ie
s
fo
r
S
e
le
c
te
d
S
ta
te
s
o
f
U
.S
.
T
h
is
fi
g
u
re
sh
o
w
s
y
ie
ld
s
o
n
re
a
l
es
ta
te
lo
a
n
s,
co
m
m
er
ci
a
l
a
n
d
in
d
u
st
ri
a
l
lo
a
n
s,
co
n
su
m
er
lo
a
n
s,
g
o
v
er
n
m
en
t
se
cu
ri
ti
es
,
m
o
rt
g
a
g
e-
b
a
ck
ed
se
cu
ri
ti
es
,
a
n
d
d
ep
o
si
t
a
t
th
e
st
a
te
le
v
el
fr
o
m
2
0
0
2
:Q
4
to
2
0
1
3
:Q
4
.
T
h
e
se
le
ct
ed
st
a
te
s
a
re
L
o
u
is
ia
n
a
,
P
en
n
sy
lv
a
n
ia
,
F
lo
ri
d
a
,
a
n
d
C
a
li
fo
rn
ia
.
39
Table 8: List of Significant Natural Disasters in the US: 2001 to 2015
Year State Mainly Affected Type Name Total Damage (Million)
2005-08/09 Louisiana Tropical storms and cyclones Hurricane Katrina 125000
2012-10 New York Tropical storms and cyclones Hurricane Sandy 80000
2004-08 Florida Tropical storms and cyclones 2004 Atlantic
Hurricane Season;
Hurricane Frances,
Ivan
18000
2005-09 Louisiana Tropical storms and cyclones Hurricane Rita 16000
2004-09 Florida Tropical storms and cyclones 2004 Atlantic
Hurricane Season;
Hurricane Frances,
Ivan
12000
2008-06 Missouri Floods June 2008 Midwest
floods
10000
2001-06 Louisiana Tropical storms and cyclones 2001 Atlantic
Hurricane Season;
Hurricane Allison
6000
2003-09 North Carolina Tropical storms and cyclones Hurricane Isabel 5000
2011-04/05 Arkansas Floods 2011 Mississippi River
Floods
3000
2010-04/05 Tennessee Floods 2010 Tennessee Floods 2350
2011-05/06 Iowa Floods 2011 Missouri River
Floods
2000
2001-02 Washington Earthquakes 2001 Nisqually
earthquake
2000
2013-09 Colorado Floods 2013 Colorado floods 900
2011-08 Pennsylvania Floods 2011 Atlantic
Hurricane Season;
Tropical Storm Lee
1200
2011-09 Mississippi Tropical storms and cyclones 2011Atlantic
Hurricane Season;
Tropical Storm Lee
1000
2006-06 Pennsylvania Floods Mid-Atlantic United
States flood of 2006
1000
2002-07 Texas Floods Late June and Early
July Floods of 2002
1000
40
